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Abstract 
This study investigated corporate governance attributes, firm performance and directors’ remuneration as 
evidenced by quoted firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The specific objectives examined: the effect and 
relationship between Board size, Board independence, director ownership, chief executive officer (CEO) Duality, 
Audit Committee Independence, firm performance and firm size with directors’ remuneration.In view of this, 100 
firms were selected using stratified purposive sampling technique. Data were collected Historical data on the 
dependent and independent variables were extracted from the financial statements and accounts of the sampled 
firms over the period of 5 years from 2008-.2012, employing  the Panel Least Square regression statistical 
instrument employed This study found that board size, firm performance and firm size has significant effect on 
directors remuneration, while, board independence, ownership structure, CEO duality and Audit committee have 
no significant (negative) relationship with directors remuneration. Conclusively, good corporate governance is 
crucial in assessment and fixing of directors remuneration and resolving the agency problems. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board Size, Firm Performance, Firm Size, Directors’ Remuneration. 
 
1. Introduction 
Corporate governance is principally on the structure of relationship within an organisation which is directed at best 
practice in the overall interest of the firm and its dispersed stakeholders. Jerab (2011) opines that corporate 
governance has many benefits and effects; it creates more open, transparent society, corruption prevention, rule of 
law with fairness and order and promoting ethical wealth creation. The strategy for addressing the challenges of 
corporate governance has taken various forms at both the national and International levels and has culminated in 
initiatives such as: the OECD Code; the Cadbury Report; the Basel Committee Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance; the King’s Report of South Africa. In a bid to improve corporate governance in Nigeria, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), in pursuance of its regulatory and supervisory role over the securities of public 
companies in Nigeria vested in it by Section 13 of the Investment and Securities Act, 2007, inaugurated a National 
Committee in September, 2008 to review the 2003 Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies. The 
objective was to identify and address the weaknesses in the 2003 Code with a view to improving the mechanism 
for the enforceability of the Code and recommend ways of effecting greater compliance.  
 Corporate governance is a system by which firms are governed and controlled with a view to increasing 
shareholder value and meeting the expectations of the other stakeholders (CBN, 2006) corporate governance is the 
ability of boards of directors to combine leadership with control and effectiveness with accountability that will 
primarily determine how well companies meet society's expectations (Cadbury report, 1993). Directors of a 
company are the essential fulcrum upon which the management of companies rest. The roles, duties and 
importance of Company directors are well documented in the Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2004.  
 The high remuneration received by directors’ of corporate bodies have been questioned as to if such 
remuneration are justified by the underlying economic performance of the company in question.  These debates 
have tended to focus on four areas: the overall level of directors’ remuneration and the role of share options, the 
suitability of performance measures linking directors’ remuneration with performance, corporate size, the role 
played by the remuneration committee in the setting of directors’ remuneration and the influence that shareholders 
are able to exercise on directors’ remuneration (Rashidah, 2004). The debate on executive directors’ remuneration 
has been driven by the view that some directors, and especially those directors in the banking sector, are being 
overpaid to the detriment of the shareholders, other employees, and the company as a whole. The need for the 
practice of good corporate governance is therefore not only necessary but could be defeated when directors 
remunerations are not questioned  Most studies on corporate governance and director remuneration were conducted 
in developed countries. To the best of our knowledge, existing studies in Nigeria have produced little or no clear 
consensus on the relationship between corporate governance attributes, corporate financial performance and 
directors’ remuneration. The thrust of this study therefore is to investigate the relationship among corporate 
governance, firm performance and directors’ remuneration.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Concept of Directors Remuneration 
A director is referred to as the professional manager, in this regards his judgment may not be the best amongst 
alternatives, as he cannot represent the shareholders and impartially sit in judgment of himself (Wallace & Zinkin, 
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2005). As stated under Section 224(1) of CAMA (2004), directors of a company are persons duly appointed by 
the company to direct and manage the business of the company. This is the most important need and responsibility 
which the law places on company directors. But while the need for company directors is primarily that of 
overseeing the day to day management of the company, the need of the Board of Directors, is policy formulation. 
In course of the directors discharging their duties and responsibilities, they are expected to receive remuneration. 
Remuneration is every form of salaries, allowances or incentives and bonuses received by the employee (Oviantari, 
2011). Broadly speaking, remuneration obtained consists of cash remuneration and remuneration based on shares 
that are associated with short-term performance and long term Chief executive (CEO) compensation. 
  
Empirical Evidence between Corporate Governance Attributes and Director Remuneration 
Board Size and Director’s Remuneration 
The size of the board is imperative in fixing the directors’ remuneration. Board size refers to the total number 
directors in a company (Abdullah 2004). The number of directors in a board of directors of a company ranges from 
a small number to a large number. Kajola (2008), examined the relationship between Corporate Governance and 
Firm Performance he examined the relationship between four corporate governance mechanisms (board size, board 
composition, chief executive status and audit committee) and two firm performance measures (return on equity, 
ROE, and profit margin, PM), using a sample of twenty Nigerian listed firms between 2000 and 2006 based on 
panel data and Ordinary Least Square as a method of estimation, he found a positive significant relationship 
between Return on Equity and board size as well as chief executive status.  
 Meanwhile, Yermack (1996) found that small boards give CEOs larger incentives and force them to bear 
more risks than large board firm. Holthausen and Larcker (1993) argue that board size might influence directors’ 
pay, also Core,Holthausen &Larker (1999) established a positive association between board size and executive 
remuneration. Ozkan (2011) evidenced a positive and significant association between CEO compensation and 
board size. Also Yatim (2013)  employed across-sectional analysis of 428 listed firms on the Bursa Malaysia for 
the financial year ending 2008 and found that board size is positively and significantly related to directors 
remuneration We hypothetically state that, H1: Board size has no significant influence on directors’ remuneration.  
 
Board Independence and Directors’ Remuneration  
The independence board is vital aspect of the firm designed to promote good corporate governance. The Code in 
Nigeria provides that the Board should comprise a mix of executive and non-executive directors and that the non-
executive directors should be in the majority. Indubitably, the rationale behind this wise provision is to ensure a 
check on the activities of the executive directors by the non-executive directors. In proposing a model structure 
for the Board, the Code stipulates that there should be at least, one independent director in the Board and directors 
are to receive any form of remuneration. 
 Ozkan (2007) empirically examined the influence of corporate governance mechanisms, that is, 
ownership and board structure of companies, on the level of CEO compensation for a sample of 414 large UK 
companies for the fiscal year 2003/2004, based on their findings, firms with large board size and a higher 
proportion of non-executive directors on their boards pay their CEOs higher compensation. Also, Sapp (2007) 
studied the impact of corporate governance on executive compensation, by examining the relationship between 
the compensation of the top five executives using a sample of 400 publicly listed Canadian firms while considering 
various internal and external corporate governance-related factors. They find that the variances in internal 
governance, is related to the differences across firms in the characteristics of the CEO, compensation committee 
and board of directors do influence both the level and composition of executive compensation, especially for the 
CEO. Following the outcome of the findings, we hypothesized that, H2: There is no significant relationship 
between board independence and director remuneration. 
 
Ownership Structure and Directors’ Remuneration 
Ownership of the firm forms another basis for the determination of directors’ remuneration. Several prior studies 
have really argued the rationale on directors’ remuneration. Firth, Tam & Tang, (2007) in their study on top 
management pay, provides evidence that ownership structure is an important determinant of executive 
compensation because it determines the owners’ incentives to monitor the managers’ performance and set their 
compensation.the   Hartzell and Starks (2003) studied the relationship between institutional investors and executive 
compensation using a sample of 1914 firms for the years 1992 to 1997, their findings shows a negative relationship 
between institutional percentage stock ownership and the level of cash executive compensation. Cheung et al. 
(2005) analyze a sample of 412 Hong Kong firms and argue that CEOs with large share ownership may 
complement their cash compensation with dividend income. .  
 Parthasarathy, Menon and Bhatthacherjee (2006) empirically studied the relationship between Executive 
Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance using a sample of 409 companies listed on Bombay 
Stock Exchange their findings show that institutional ownership has a positive relationship and statistically 
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significant on executive compensation. According to Ozkan (2007) institutional ownership and block-holder 
ownership have a significant and negative impact on CEO compensation, the results show that CEO compensation 
is lower when the directors’ ownership is higher. Based on the outcome of the studies, we hypothetically state that, 
H3: Ownership structure has no significant effect on directors’ remuneration. 
 
CEO Duality and Director’s Remuneration  
Several studies have examined the separation of CEO and chairman of the board. It is reported that too much 
power is concentrated on the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and the CEOs, more often than not, are also the 
Chairmen of the boards of directors. This lack of check and balance compromise the ability to make independent 
decisions on behalf of the shareholders (Quadric, 2010).  Ryan & Wiggings (2004) study focused on who is in 
whose pocket? Directors’ compensation board Independence and barriers to effective monitoring they find that 
CEO duality has a negative impact on total director compensation. Having examined the finding, we hypothesize 
that, H4: There is no significant relationship between CEO Duality and directors’ remuneration.  
   
Audit Committee and Directors Remuneration  
The Audit Committee is a committee composed of independent, non-executive directors charged with oversight 
functions of ensuring responsible Corporate Governance, a reliable financial reporting process, an effective 
internal control structure, a credible audit function, an informed whistleblower complaint process and an 
appropriate code of business ethics with the purpose of creating long-term shareholder value while protecting the 
interests of other stakeholders (Rezaee, 2009). According to Habbash (2010) audit committee independence is 
measured as the number of independent non-executive directors on the audit committee compared to the total 
number of committee members.  
 The Audit Committee remains one of the most important governance mechanisms that has been suggested 
for improved corporate transparency, accountability and reporting quality in organisations (Zhang et al, 2007). 
Similarly, Choi et al. (2004) find that, when members of the audit committee hold shares in their firm, they are 
less effective in mitigating earnings management. Thus, the independence of the audit committee is a key factor 
in enhancing its role in preventing miss-statements in the financial statements. Hence, we hypothesized that, H5:  
Audit committee independence has no significant effect on directors’ remuneration.   
  
Corporate Firm Performance and Directors Remuneration   
A firm’s financial performance serves as a general measure of a company’s overall financial health over a given 
period of time. Parthasarathy, Menon & Bhatthacherjee (2006) empirically studied the relationship between 
Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance using a sample of 409 companies listed 
on Bombay Stock Exchange their findings show that corporate performance has positive and significant influence 
on executive compensation. Kato and Long (2006) found a positive executive pay-performance relation by 
examining 937 listed firms from 1998 to 2002. Tosi, Werner, Jeffrey, Kartz, Luis & Mejia (2000) found a weak 
relationship between compensation and performance, while Fleming & Stellios (2002) found no relation between 
executive compensation and firm performance. 
 Crumley (2008) studied the relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation in U.S. 
commercial banking industry. The study uses 36 sample banking companies in the U.S. in period 2001-2003. The 
results show that there is a weak relationship among the percentage change in stock return and percentage return 
on assets and CEO compensation.  
 Sigler (2011) examines the relationship of CEO pay and company performance for 280 firms listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange for a period from 2006 through 2009. It is their findings that there is a positive and 
significant relationship between total CEO compensation and company performance measured by return on equity. 
Greg (2011) examines the pay- performance relationship of executives in all UK companies and in financial 
services companies, and finds a weak relationship between executive pay and company performance. Following 
the outcome of the above, we therefore hypothesized that: H6: firm performance has significant influence on 
directors’ remuneration. 
  
Firm Size and Directors Remuneration 
The size of the firm has been another crucial issue in directors remuneration. According to Chalmers (2006), CEOs 
having higher quality skills, qualification and diverse characteristics are required for larger firms and they are paid 
accordingly. Hijazi and  Bhatti (2007), found that the Company size is closely related to job complexity and 
employer's ability to pay in determining executive pay. Parthasarathy, Menon and Bhatthacherjee (2006) 
empirically studied the relationship between Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate 
Governance using a sample of 409 companies listed on Bombay Stock Exchange their findings show that firm size 
has positive and significant impact on compensation. According to Li, Moshirian, Nguyen and Tan (2007) the 
inverse relation between company size and pay-performance sensitivities is not surprising, since risk-averse and 
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wealth-constrained CEOs of large firms can feasibly “own” only a tiny fraction of the company cash flows through 
their stock, options, and incentive compensation. 
 Mengistae  and Xu (2004), Firth, Tam and Tang (2006),  and Conyon (2008) found  that the compensation 
level increases with firm size, possibly because larger firms are more complex and hence require more management 
skills or because they have a larger resource base to attract top talent. Growth opportunity is also found to be 
positively associated with executive compensation (Conyon, 2008), possibly because a high-growth firm requires 
a more competent manager who deserves higher pay. Based on the above indications, we hypothesized that, 
H7:Firm size has significant effect on directors remuneration. 
 
Theoretical Framework  
This study is anchored on agency theory. The agency theory paradigm, first formulated in the early 1970s (Ross 
1973, Jensen & Meckling 1976) and had become the dominant institutional logic of corporate governance (Zajac 
&Westphal 2004). Agency theory explains a situation whereby management acts as agent for owners’ or 
shareholders’ best interest.  According to Mohammad, Abdullah and  Md Shukor (2009) the association between 
corporate governance and directors’ remuneration can first be explained by the agency theory. Agency theory 
refers to the relationship between management and shareholders, in which management acts as agent for 
shareholders’ best interest. The agency relationship arising from the separation of ownership from management is 
sometimes characterized as agency problem. Agency relationships occur when the principals hire the agent to 
perform a service on the principals' behalf.  
 Principals commonly delegate decision-making authority to the agents. Agency problems can arise 
because of inefficiencies and incomplete information. Agency theory is concerned with resolving problems that 
can exist in agency relationships; that is, between principals (such as shareholders) and agents of the principals 
(for example, company executives). The two problems that agency theory addresses are: 1.) the problems that arise 
when the desires or goals of the principal and agent are in conflict, and the principal is unable to verify (because 
it difficult and/or expensive to do so) what the agent is actually doing; and 2.) the problems that arise when the 
principal and agent have different attitudes towards risk. Conflict of interest may arise. One of the reasons is 
executives receive their salaries, bonuses and stock option in a different form from shareholders who receive 
dividends and capital gains.  
 
3. Methodology 
Design and Method 
This study is a longitudinal survey, covering a time period of five years (2008-2012). A total of one hundred and 
ninety-eight(198) firms quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange as at 31st December, 2012 constituted the 
population (The NSE, Annual Report and Accounts, 2013:122). A sample of one hundred (100) firms was selected 
using stratified purposive sampling technique since these firms usually publish regular annual financial reports 
and accounts. However, in considering sample size, Saunders and Thornhill (2003) suggested that a minimum 
number of thirty (30) for statistical analyses provide a useful rule of thumb. Historical data used were obtained 
from published annual reports and accounts of the sampled firms.  
 
Model Specification  
A Mode is a miniature and replica of real world situation. Model specification is essential in every study, in the 
sense that it gives direction of the variables specifically examined. Model specification entails the determination 
of the endogenous and exogenous variables that needed to be included in the model and the a priori expectation 
about the sign and the size of the parameters of the function (Brooks 2008; Gujarati & Porter, 2009; Kozhan, 2010) 
as stated in Emeh & Appah (2013). 
REMit = β0t + β3BSIZEit +β4BINDit + β1DIROWNit + β2CEODUALit + β5AUDCOMit– β7ROAI +β6FSIZEit + єit 
Where; REM (directors’ remuneration), Corporate financial performance is represented by ROA (Return 
on Assets), FirmSize (Log of Total Assets), BIND (Board Independence), BSIZE (Board Size), DOWN (Directors’ 
Ownerships) CEOD (CEO duality), AUDCOM (Audit committee independence),  it (time element and cross 
sectional data) 
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Operationalisation of Variables 
Variables Proxy Notation Apriori/Sign 
Directors’ 
remuneration 
REM Directors’ remuneration has been taken as a dependant 
variable which is measured by Log of  
Directors’ salaries plus benefits 
 
Board Size BSIZE Board size: Board size is the number of directors present on 
the board.  Henderson & Fredrickson (1996), Yu et al. 
(2002) 
+ve/-ve 
(>or <1) 
Board 
Independence 
BIND Board Independence is measured as the ratio of the Number 
of Independent Non executive Directors to Total Number of 
Directors on the board  
(Kajola , 2008) 
   +ve 
(BIND>1) 
Directors’ 
owning 
DOWN Directors’ Owning  is measured by the ratio of Shares held 
by Board of directors to the total number of shares held by 
the company 
+ve 
(>1) 
CEO duality CEOD CEO Duality is measured by taking a dummy variable 
putting one if duality is present otherwise 0.  Conyon & 
Peck (1998)  
+ve 
(>1) 
 
Audit committee 
independence 
AUDCOM This is measured by the ratio of independent non-executive 
directors on the audit committee compared to the total 
number of committee members Habbassh (2010), Kajola 
(2008). 
 
-ve 
( AUCOM 
<1 ) 
Return on Assets ROA performance measure is the Return on  Assets( ROA) is an 
indicator of the management’s ability to efficiently utilize 
corporate resources (assets) that ultimately belong to 
shareholders (Shah, Javed & Abbas, 2009) 
 
  +ve / -ve 
( ROA>or<1) 
Firm Size SIZE Firm size is measured as the log of total assets  (Shah, Javed 
& Abbas, 2009)   
+ve/-ve 
(Fsize > or < 
1) 
Source: Researchers’ survey (2015) 
The statistical device employed is the Panel least square (PLS) regression for the purpose of  testing the 
relationship that exists between corporate governance mechanism, firm performance and  directors’ remuneration. 
To ensure that our model is statistical and econometrically valid, diagnostic test such as, normality test, goodness 
fit, heteroscedasticity test and Ramsey RESET test were carried out,  Data collected were estimated with 
econometric software (EViews 7.0 and SPSS. 20).  
 
4. Data Analysis and Interpretation of Result. 
This section analysed the diagnostics procedure, descriptive statistics, Pearson correlations and the Panel Least 
square (PLS) regression as below. 
Diagnostics procedure  
Table 1: Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     F-statistic 1.403830     Prob. F(4,145) 0.2356 
Obs*R-squared 5.592377     Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.2317 
Scaled explained SS 34.77847     Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.0000 
     
 Table 1 shows the Breusch–Pagan-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test for the presence of auto correlation. 
The result reveals that the probability values of 0.2356 (24%) and 0.2317 (23%) is greater than the critical value 
of 0.05 (5%). This implies that there is no evidence for the presence of serial correlation. 
 
Table 2: White Heteroskedasticity Test:   
     
     F-statistic 0.925740     Prob. F(12,137) 0.5233 
Obs*R-squared 11.25072     Prob. Chi-Square(12) 0.5076 
Scaled explained SS 69.96717     Prob. Chi-Square(12) 0.0000 
     
     
 Table2 indicates the White Heteroskedasticity test for the presence of heteroskedasticity. The outcome of 
econometric result shows that the calculated P-values of 0.5233 (52%) and 0.5076 (51%) are considerably higher 
than 0.05 (5%) level of significant. Therefore, there is no evidence for the presence of heteroskedasticity in the 
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model. 
 
Table 3: Ramsey RESET Test   
     
      Value df Probability  
t-statistic  0.581844  499  0.5616  
F-statistic  0.338542 (1, 499)  0.5616  
Likelihood ratio  0.352234  1  0.5529  
     
      Table 3 reveals the Ramsey RESET test for misspecification. The econometric result indicates that the p- 
values computed were at 0.5616 (56%) and 0.5529 (55%) were  greater than the critical value of 0.05 (5%). Hence, 
it is obvious that there is no apparent non-linearity in the regression equation and we therefore concluded that the 
linear model is appropriate 
 
Table 4:  Descriptive Statistics   
 DIREM BSIZE BIND DIROWN CEODUALAUDCOMINDROA FSIZE 
 Mean  1.01E+08  9.861723  73.01844 8.515701  0.416834  0.547896  18.10591  10.16713 
 Median  29281000  10.00000  71.40000 8.596100  0.000000  0.500000  14.48000  9.974428 
 Maximum  3.67E+09  18.00000  800.0000 11.83210  1.000000  1.000000  88.21000  14.07859 
 Minimum  0.000000  5.000000  41.60000 5.131900  0.000000  0.300000 -23.53000  7.181958 
 Std. Dev.  2.74E+08  2.707812  35.56459 1.311652  0.493530  0.123188  14.39159  1.008883 
 Skewness  8.936044  0.424706  17.13960-0.174419  0.337365  1.425234  1.398971  0.749562 
 Kurtosis  108.0652  2.570467  351.3368 2.771490  1.113815  5.726379  7.198760  3.933162 
 Jarque-Bera  23.61540  18.83721  25.47261 3.615761  83.43600  32.34831  52.93155  64.83177 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000081  0.000000 0.164001  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 Sum  5.06E+10  4921.000  36436.20 4249.335  208.0000  273.4000  9034.850  5073.398 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  3.75E+19  3651.459  629890.3 856.7752  121.2986  7.557291  103144.6  506.8869 
 Observations  499  499  499  499  499  499  499  499 
Table 4 highlights descriptive statistics of the variables examined with emphasis on mean, maximum, 
minimum and standard deviation and the Jarque-Bera test results. Outcome of the Jarque-Bera P-value calculated 
in respective variables were less than critical 5% level of significant indicating that the results are normally 
distributed as shown in appendix. 
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Table 5:  Pearson Correlations 
GET DATA /TYPE=XLSX 
/FILE='C:\Documents and Settings\j\Desktop\OMOYE Ph.D DATA.xlsx' 
/SHEET=name 'Sheet1' 
/CELLRANGE=full 
/READNAMES=on 
/ASSUMEDSTRWIDTH=32767. 
EXECUTE. 
DATASET NAME DataSet1 WINDOW=FRONT. 
CORRELATIONS 
/VARIABLES=DIREM BSIZE BIND DIROWN CEODUAL AUDCOMIND ROA FSIZE 
/PRINT=TWOTAIL NOSIG 
/MISSING=PAIRWISE 
 DIREM BSIZE BIND DIROWN CEODUAL AUDCOMIND ROA FSIZE 
DIREM 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .413** -.071 .260** -.186** -.071 .180** .400** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .114 .000 .000 .114 .000 .000 
N 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 499 
BSIZE 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.413** 1 -.083 .395** -.345** -.167** .020 .539** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .064 .000 .000 .000 .660 .000 
N 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 499 
BIND 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.071 -.083 1 -.011 .015 .031 .012 -.069 
Sig. (2-tailed) .114 .064  .798 .745 .492 .795 .124 
N 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 499 
DIROWN 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.260** .395** -.011 1 -.498** -.189** .267** .448** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .798  .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 499 
CEODUAL 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.186** -.345** .015 -.498** 1 .200** -.157** -.411** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .745 .000  .000 .000 .000 
N 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 499 
AUDCOMIND 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.071 -.167** .031 -.189** .200** 1 .116** .109* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .114 .000 .492 .000 .000  .010 .015 
N 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 499 
ROA 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.180** .020 .012 .267** -.157** .116** 1 .204** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .660 .795 .000 .000 .010  .000 
N 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 499 
FSIZE 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.400** .539** -.069 .448** -.411** .109* .204** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .124 .000 .000 .015 .000  
N 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 5 shows associations of variables captured in the study.  Meanwhile, all the Pearson correlations of variable 
were positively and negatively related1% and 5% significance level and at 2-tailed as indicated in appendix. 
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Table 6:  
 
Dependent Variable: DIREM   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 16/12/14   Time: 03:58   
Sample: 2008 2012   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 100   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 499  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -9.68E+08 1.47E+08 -6.594483 0.0000 
BSIZE 26589347 4958930. 5.361912 0.0000 
BIND -185427.0 302729.0 -0.612518 0.5405 
DIROWN 3285463. 10589037 0.310270 0.7565 
CEODUAL 39394487 26932415 1.462716 0.1442 
AUDCOMIND -1.40E+08 91977618 -1.519739 0.1292 
ROA 2348165. 795413.7 2.952130 0.0033 
FSIZE 79724709 13965605 5.708647 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.653685     Mean dependent var 1.01E+08 
Adjusted R-squared 0.643046     S.D. dependent var 2.74E+08 
S.E. of regression 2.39E+08     Akaike info criterion 41.43532 
Sum squared resid 2.80E+19     Schwarz criterion 41.50286 
Log likelihood -10330.11     Hannan-Quinn criter. 41.46183 
F-statistic 23.84279     Durbin-Watson stat 2.087143 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      The coefficient of determinationR2 which stood at 0.65, shows that over 65% of the systematic variations 
in the dependent variable were explained by the independent variables, while the remaining 35% were unexplained. 
Similarly, the adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted R-square) R2 which revealed significant value of 
0.64 implies that over 64% changes in the dependent variable (Directors Remuneration) were accounted for by the 
independent variables while the remaining 36% were unaccounted for hence captured by the stochastic 
disturbances. 
The overall F-statistics (goodness- of- fitness measure) stood at significant value of 23.84 and P-value of 
0.000 while standard error of regression (S.E Regression) indicates a minimal value of 2.39. Durbin –Watson (DW) 
statistic stood at a value of 2.087 indicating absent of auto-correlation. The entire results were highly significant, 
capable for prediction and meaningful for decision making.  
 
Discussion of Findings 
The findings are discussed as follows. 
 Board size which has Jacque-Bera test value of 18.837 with P-value of 0.000 (0%), positively associated 
at Pearson correlation value of 0.413** (significant at 10%) and t-statistics value of 5.3619 with P-value of 0.000 
(0%) which is less than critical P-value of 5%, implied that Board size has significant influence on directors’ 
remuneration. This means that the size of the board is crucial issue influencing directors’ remuneration and the 
responsibilities and tasks to be carried out. It is important that the board size (comprising of executive and non 
executive), their compensation must be aligned with the interest of the shareholders. The finding is in line with 
Yermack (1996) who established that boards of directors are given higher incentive so as to increase their 
performance. Consequently, Ryan and Wiggings (2004); Firth et al (2007) and Feng et al (2007) argued that there 
is negative relationship between board size and directors compensation. 
  Board independence which stood at Jacque-Bera test value of 25.472 with P-value of 0.000 (0%), 
negatively associated at Pearson correlation value of -0.017  and t-statistics value of -0.016 with P-value of 0.5405 
(54%) which is greater than critical P-value of 5%, implied that there is no significant (negative) relationship 
between board independence and director remuneration. This shows that a well organized board independence 
with a regulated corporate governance can frustrate over increased directors’ remuneration. To buttress the finding, 
Conyon and Peck (1998) established that board independence has no effect on CEO Compensation. Similarly, 
Ozkan (2007) empirically found that firms with large board size and a higher proportion of non-executive directors 
on their boards pay their CEOs higher compensation, suggesting that non-executive directors are more efficient in 
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monitoring than executive directors. 
 Ownership structure (shareholdings) stood at Jacque-Bera test value of 3.615 with P-value of 0.164 (16%), 
positively associated at Pearson correlation value of 0.260** and t-statistics value of 0.3104 with P-value of 0.7565 
(76%) which is greater than critical P-value of 5%. This indicated that Ownership structure has no significant 
effect on directors’ remuneration. This finding supports the empirical studies of Cyert et al (2002), Hartzell and 
Starks (2003), Ozkan (2007) who revealed that directors ownership has negative relationship with directors 
compensations and remunerations. However, Menon and Bhatthacherjee (2006) argued that directors 
shareholdings and institutional ownership have positive relationship and statistically significant on executive 
compensation.   
 CEO Duality which stood at Jacque-Bera test value of 83.436 with P-value of 0.000 (0%), negatively 
associated at Pearson correlation value of -0.186** and t-statistics value of 1.4627 with P-value of 0.1442 (14%) 
which is greater than critical P-value of 5%, This indicated that there is no significant (negative) relationship 
between CEO Duality and directors’ remuneration. This finding is similar with Ryan and Wiggings (2004) who 
established that CEO duality has a negative impact on total director compensation. 
  Audit  committee independence which revealed Jacque-Bera test value of 32.348with P-value of 0.000 
(0%), negatively associated at Pearson correlation value of -0.071  and t-statistics value of -1.520 with P-value of 
0.1292 (13%) which is greater than critical P-value of 5%, suggested that audit committee independence has no 
significant effect on directors’ remuneration. The finding supports the view of Zhang et al, (2007) who stated that 
the Audit Committee remains one of the most important governance mechanisms that has been suggested for 
improved corporate transparency, accountability and reporting quality in organizations.  
 Firm performance proxied by ROA which stood at Jacque-Bera test value of 52.9316 with P-value of 
0.000 (0%), positively associated at Pearson correlation value of 0.180**(at 10% significant level), and t-statistics 
value of 2.9521 with P-value of 0.0033 (0%) which is less than critical P-value of 5%, revealed that firm 
performance has significant influence on directors remuneration. This buttresses the findings Kato and Long 
(2006), and Parthasarathy, et.al (2006) who found a positive executive pay-performance relationship, but 
vehemently argued by Crumley (2008), Greg (2011) and Sigler (2011) that a weak relationship exists between 
company performance and executive pay. 
 Firm size which stood at Jacque-Bera test value of 64.831with P-value of 0.000 (0%), positively 
associated at Pearson correlation value of 0.400** (10% significant level), and t-statistics value of 5.7086 with P-
value of 0.000 (0%) which is less than critical P-value of 5%, indicated that firm size has significant effect on 
directors remuneration. This supported the findings of Parthasarathy, et.al (2006), Mengistae  and Xu (2004), Firth, 
Tam et.al., (2006),  and Conyon (2008) found  that firm size has positive and significant impact on compensation 
and that the compensation level increases with firm size,  
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations                                       
The link between corporate governance and directors’ remuneration has been issue of considerable focus. Since 
corporate governance practices are aimed towards ensuring that affairs of firms are directed and controlled, the 
manner in which directors are remunerated become important. With corporate governance, the manner in which 
directors are remunerated are expected to be credible. Hence directors’ remuneration are based on the overall 
interest of the firm and for the crucial roles they perform in the firm. The corporate governance practice paves 
ways upon which special procedures need to be followed in the remuneration of directors. All protocols are 
observed in the firms in the way directors are remunerated based on corporate governance practices of the firm. 
We therefore conclude that with good corporate governance the manner in which firm financial resources are 
judiciously spent and directors’ remuneration are fixed based on the laid down practices of the firm. 
Based on the findings, these recommendations were put forward. 
Board of directors size should be used as criteria and basis for fixing directors remuneration. A large 
board size should be assigned large amount for the payment of the directors’ remuneration compare to when the 
board size is small. 
The independence board of directors as a powerful corporate governance attributes charged with the 
responsibility of monitoring and controlling executive directors activities should not be used as criteria for the 
remuneration of the directors. 
Director shareholding or ownership should not be basis for fixing directors remuneration. Irrespective of 
the proportion of shares held by both executive and non executive directors, their remuneration should be   based 
on the firm. On no account should directors of firms take advantages of the numbers of shares owned in the firm 
as basis for the determination of their remuneration. The corporate governance practices designed to be followed 
irrespective of the shares held as regards directors remuneration must be strictly followed. 
The chief executive officer (CEO) duality tends to have influence in the firm. One person acting as 
chairman and CEO of the firm should not be a yardstick in the determination of directors’ remuneration .The CEO 
duality as corporate governance mechanism should act within the ambit of the task responsibility and authority but 
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not to be interfered with the directors’ remuneration. 
The audit committee independence in the firm are expected to posses financial expertise who are in better 
position to assess what should be paid as remuneration to the directors. The opinion and consent of the 
independence audit committee is very necessary in fixing the remuneration of directors. 
The performance proxy by the returns on assets should be another criterion the corporate governance 
practices of firms should consider in the remuneration of directors. When the firm is performing excellently well 
from the assessment of the returns on total assets of the firm, the directors should be well remunerated. 
The size of the firm should be a vital basis for the remuneration of directors. A large firm is expected to 
possess more challenges, complexity, responsibility and bottleneck in terms of direction and control. An organized 
corporate governance practices are expected in large firms compare to small firms. As such the size of the firm 
should be a yardstick in fixing directors remuneration. 
The position of companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 2004 as regards to directors’ remuneration 
should be carefully followed. The manner in which the CAMA 2004 has addressed the director remuneration must 
not be altered by any director irrespective of his or position. All the various institutions and bodies responsible for 
the drafting of CAMA should ensures that companies in Nigeria comply with the conditions and manners in which 
directors are remunerated in firms. 
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